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MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND  
SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF

 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Professor Judith Resnik coined the term “managerial judging” 
thirty years ago to describe the expanded role of federal district judges 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, two distinct lines of scholarly 
analysis have emerged to discuss judicial management and innovation in 
complex civil cases. The first, which predates Resnik and is associated 
most closely with a seminal article by Professor Abe Chayes, focuses 
attention on the substantive content of constitutional and statutory norms 
and the role of the judge following adjudication of the merits in using the 
remedial powers of the court to carry those norms into effect. The second, 
which has come to occupy a central role in more recent debates over the 
judicial function, concerns the earlier phases of the litigation process in 
complex cases, when strong direction from the judge and decisions about 
scheduling, discovery, joinder, and communication with attorneys can 
channel settlement negotiations and shape outcomes. In both discussions, 
the figure of the proactive jurist, involved in case management from the 
outset of the litigation and attentive throughout the proceedings to the 
impact of her decisions on settlement dynamics—a managerial judge—has 
displaced the passive umpire as the dominant paradigm in the federal 
district courts.
1
 
This bifurcation into two lines of analysis—one concerned with 
judicially supervised post-adjudication remedies in public law disputes 
and hence implicitly “substantive,” the other focused on pretrial 
proceedings in complex litigation and hence implicitly “procedural”—has 
obscured the dynamic nature of the relationship that frequently exists 
between the mechanisms of litigation and the underlying substantive law. 
It is true that the business of judging implicates distinctive institutional 
and procedural norms that are worthy of study in their own right. But it is 
 
 
  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Institute for Law and 
Economic Policy has my thanks for including me in the distinguished conference that gave rise to this 
article. Conversations with Steve Burbank, Sam Issacharoff, Arthur Miller, Judith Resnik, David 
Shapiro, and Linda Silberman all served to enrich and sharpen my thinking on the matters I explore 
here. 
 1. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).  
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also true that the institutional and procedural norms of the judiciary 
interface with controlling liability and regulatory policies in defining the 
parameters of litigation. When a federal judge engages in heavy-handed 
case management or makes decisions about the proper bounds of a 
complex proceeding, it is not just the norms of judging but also the 
applicable liability policies that must guide her in that endeavor. Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins
2
 and the Rules Enabling Act,
3
 properly understood, 
both require such an approach. Professor Robert Cover made this 
observation almost forty years ago in a tribute to James Moore, one of the 
fathers of the Federal Rules, in terms that the Academy has largely let slip 
from its collective memory. 
 We have become so transfixed by the achievement of James 
Wm. Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing, expounding 
and annotating a great trans-substantive code of procedure that we 
often miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure 
generalized across substantive lines and procedure applied to 
implement a particular substantive end. There are, indeed, trans-
substantive values which may be expressed, and to some extent 
served, by a code of procedure. But there are also demands of 
particular substantive objectives which cannot be served except 
through the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of 
process to a case or to an area of law.
4
 
In some cases, controlling liability policies may provide a basis for 
arguing that restraint is required in shaping a complex proceeding. Such 
was the holding of the Supreme Court in the portion of its Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
5
 decision that found the class certified in that case to 
violate the requirement of commonality under Rule 23. Although portions 
of the Court’s analysis may shape the construction of Rule 23(a) to some 
extent in other types of dispute, the commonality holding in Dukes is at 
base a statement of Title VII policy. In contrast, the portion of the Court’s 
opinion that rejected the use of Rule 23(b)(2) to certify a class of workers 
seeking backpay for sex discrimination is primarily about the scope and 
 
 
 2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 4. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975). In an accidental commentary on the Academy’s failure to retain Cover’s 
insights here, the Westlaw electronic copy of the publication renders the late scholar’s name as 
“Robert M. Covert.” The wisdom in this essay has indeed become a covert presence in discourse about 
the judicial function. See id., available at http://www.westlaw.com. 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1029 
 
 
 
 
operation of Rule 23(b)(2) itself—a trans-substantive procedural ruling. 
But even that portion of the opinion implicates questions of Title VII 
policy in ways that commentary on the opinion has not yet appreciated. 
The Court’s fleeting answers to those Title VII questions contributed to its 
conclusion that class certification was improper. A more careful focus on 
the relationship between Title VII policy and the operation of Rule 23 
serves to clarify the Dukes decision and highlights possible grounds for 
critiquing and distinguishing the Court’s ruling. 
In other cases, the substantive law may affirmatively support judicial 
management and procedural innovation. The claims of first responders 
injured by the toxic conditions at the site of the September 11, 2001 World 
Trade Center disaster offer a prominent example. In a series of targeted 
enactments, Congress created a comprehensive scheme for the resolution 
of those first-responder claims, specifying a liability rule, preempting 
alternative remedies, imposing a collective damages cap, and enacting an 
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the federal court in the Southern District 
of New York that resulted in the consolidation of more than 10,000 
individual cases before Judge Alvin Hellerstein. In confronting the task of 
adjudicating these claims, Judge Hellerstein concluded that the proceeding 
before him required that he enforce a standard of fairness and adequacy in 
assessing the relief available to claimants, rather than simply treating the 
action before him as a standard-issue claims-processing mechanism for 
unconnected individuals, and he aggressively managed the litigation in 
order to supervise the proposed compensation.
6
 
As the Judge has been frank to admit, some of his actions were 
unprecedented. Most notable among these was his rejection of an initial 
aggregate settlement in a non-class case, requiring the defendants to 
produce more funds and the plaintiffs’ attorneys to give up some of their 
fees before he would approve the agreement, even though all the claimants 
had signed individual retainer agreements with their attorneys.
7
 The 
proceedings, which are on appeal to the Second Circuit at the time of this 
writing, have been the subject of sharp criticism. That criticism has been 
misplaced. Judge Hellerstein acted within the proper scope of his authority 
 
 
 6. Judge Hellerstein and his special masters, Professors Henderson and Twerski, provide their 
account of the history of that proceeding and the nature of the problems they confronted in Alvin K. 
Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Managerial Judging: The 9/11 
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012), available at http://www.lawschool.cor 
nell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Hellerstein-et-al-final.pdf. 
 7. See id. at 157–72 (describing the district court’s rejection of the initial settlement and 
offering an account of the court’s reasons for believing that such managerial control of the proceeding 
was justified). 
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in employing such forceful tactics with the litigants before him. His 
authority was not that of a generic “managerial judge.” It was the authority 
to use case management and procedural innovation as tools for carrying 
into effect the distinctive liability policies enacted by Congress in the 
comprehensive statutory scheme that defined and limited the relief 
available to first responders. 
The interplay between procedural mechanisms and underlying liability 
policies is evident in more prosaic cases as well. Judges are regularly 
called upon to exercise their discretion to shape the boundaries of 
litigation within the open-textured provisions of the Federal Rules. 
Liability policy can and should guide the judge’s hand in that endeavor. 
An emerging issue in the federal district courts concerning ex parte 
discovery and the operation of joinder under Rule 20 in online copyright 
infringement suits illustrates this common dynamic. 
In this Article, I examine the interface between substantive law and 
managerial judging. My aim is not to criticize the dominant strain of 
current scholarship, with its focus on endogenous values in the practice of 
judging. That work has posed important questions that have properly 
captured the attention of Academy, Bar and Bench. It is rather to ground 
that ongoing discussion in a richer account of the role that substantive 
legal policy can and should play in defining the role of the judge, 
constraining judicial options in some cases, and legitimizing judicial 
initiative in others. 
I. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN THE BUSINESS OF JUDGING 
Commentators on the importance of procedure in substantive law 
reform frequently advert to a noted passage from Karl Llewellyn’s The 
Bramble Bush: “You must read each substantive course, so to speak, 
through the spectacles of the procedure. For what substantive law says 
should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you 
can make real.”
8
 Less frequently remarked upon is the procedural context 
in which Llewellyn was writing. The essays that make up The Bramble 
Bush were written between 1929 and 1930,
9
 prior to the enactment of the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and during a pocket of time when efforts at 
federal procedural reform appeared moribund.
10
 The Conformity Act still 
 
 
 8. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11 (2008). 
 9. See id. at xxiii. 
 10. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1089–94 
(1982). 
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governed, requiring a federal court presiding over an action at law to 
conform its procedures in most respects to those employed by the courts of 
the state where it was located. Those procedures, in turn, ranged from the 
traditional forms of action still utilized in some states, where the 
boundaries of the lawsuit as defined through joinder and pleadings derived 
from the inherent nature of the rights being prosecuted (and also were 
hampered by vestigial and inefficient anomalies), to variations on the Field 
Code, which aimed to codify procedure into an internally coherent system 
but produced unsatisfying and uneven results. Indeed, New York, where 
the Field Code originated and where Llewellyn taught, was notorious as 
one of the most troubled among the Code states, with its early reform 
efforts having metastasized to become “‘an overgrown mass of detail.’”
11
 
The unpredictable and variable nature of civil practice in the United States 
during this period was acute. As a realist commentary upon the role of 
procedure, Llewellyn’s remark was concerned more with the sheer ability 
of claimants to survive the litigation process than with the relationship 
between regulatory policy and judicial process.
12
 
The procedural reform movement that produced the Enabling Act and 
the Federal Rules sought to create uniformity in place of this disorder and 
an adjudicatory system that would facilitate rather than frustrate 
substantive legal policies. Professor Robert Bone, describing the late 
nineteenth-century conceptual traditions out of which this reform 
movement arose, explains the emerging view that “procedure was related 
instrumentally to substance. An ideal procedural system had one objective: 
to facilitate the crafting of a remedy ideally suited to redress the 
infringement of right and thus to restore the social ideal to a condition of 
equilibrium.”
13
 This conceptual tradition only benefited from the transition 
in the early twentieth-century from a natural law account of rights and 
remedies to a positive account of law and policy. In the wake of that 
transition, Bone asserts, “[m]odern legal discourse is so deeply linked to a 
 
 
 11. See id. at 1042, 1045–46 (quoting Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and 
Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 34 A.B.A. REP. 578, 
596 (1909)). 
 12. Professor Llewellyn conveys some of that procedural atmosphere in text preceding his 
famous maxim: 
The lawyer’s slip in etiquette is the client’s ruin. From this angle I say procedural regulations 
are the door, and the only door, to make real what is laid down by substantive law. Procedural 
regulations enter into and condition all substantive law’s becoming actual when there is a 
dispute. 
Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 11. 
 13. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit 
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1989). 
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vision of procedure as instrumental to a distinct body of substantive law 
that it is often difficult to imagine other possibilities.”
14
 The Rules 
Enabling Act provides doctrinal grounding for this proposition when it 
formalizes the subordinate status of practice and procedure to “substantive 
rights” in defining the scope of the rulemakers’ authority.
15
 
A countervailing trend has also emerged, however, one that is captured 
by the contemporary emphasis on the trans-substantive nature of federal 
procedure. In its most basic application, the term “trans-substantive” 
simply describes a fact about the Federal Rules, reiterated recently by 
Professor Resnik, that “[u]nlike workers’ compensation, the [1937] New 
York banking law [at issue in the Mullane case], and the FLSA, the 1930s 
Federal Rules crafted a trans-substantive set of procedures to be applied 
regardless of the kind of lawsuit (contract, tort, patent, federal statutory 
right) or the form of relief (damages or injunction).”
16
 In discussions of 
procedural reform, the principle of trans-substantivity has also performed a 
political function, serving at times to deflect targeted efforts to accomplish 
social ends through the mechanism of procedure. Thus Professor Paul 
Carrington, recapitulating some of the history described above, recounts 
the tenor of his experience in 1985 while serving as Reporter to the 
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules, when the committee reluctantly 
embraced greater transparency and public participation in the rulemaking 
process, a reform accomplished largely as a consequence of the scholarly 
critiques of Professor Stephen Burbank. Carrington writes: 
 The structure of the rulemaking process was designed to 
encourage the making of transsubtantive rules. . . . Those who 
designed and enacted the 1934 Rules Enabling Act did not suppose 
that a procedure equally suited to all kinds of cases could be 
devised, but if special rules for a substantive category of cases were 
needed, their creation would be a task for Congress. Meanwhile, 
until such a special need should appear, a politically unaccountable 
group should work to serve the broad aims . . . stated in [Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1]. Or so it was thought. 
 But after assessing the situation on the ground in 1985, it seemed 
to the Advisory Committee unlikely that continued resistance to 
open meetings would succeed. Procedural rules have substantive 
 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) & (b) (2012). 
 16. Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 140–41 (2011). 
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consequences, and the 1985 Advisory Committee felt that those 
affected by a change in the rules should be heard.
17
 
Professor Carrington captures two related dynamics in this account of 
the 1985 reform debate. First, the Rules process has long been informed 
by the belief that the rulemakers should not craft procedures specifically 
designed for particular causes of action. This first proposition tends to 
reinforce the mindset that the underlying substantive law should not 
inform the operation of the Federal Rules—a distinct issue, and one that 
does not follow from the principle of trans-substantivity, but the two have 
evolved to convergence nonetheless.
18
 Second, trans-substantivity focuses 
attention upon the practices and procedures of judging as matters with 
“substantive consequences” that are nonetheless separate and distinct from 
any substantive legal regime—a proposition that reflects a core of truth but 
that once again reinforces an artificial separation between procedure and 
substantive policy and has the capacity to hobble effective analysis. 
Professor Llewellyn’s enduring maxim has thus accommodated a range 
of meanings. When first issued, his words in The Bramble Bush served as 
a commentary on the desperate need for unifying and simplifying 
procedural reforms. Since then, his admonition has been used to 
emphasize the independent norms of judicial management to the exclusion 
of careful attention to the underlying substantive law. In the analysis that 
follows, I suggest an alternative. 
II. LIABILITY POLICY AS A PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINT:  
WAL-MART V. DUKES 
I begin by exploring the role that the underlying substantive law can 
play in constraining a judge’s managerial options in a complex 
 
 
 17. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 
DUKE L.J. 597, 617–18 (2010). 
 18. The separation-of-powers questions surrounding this aspect of the Rules Enabling Act will 
not be my focus in this Article, but it bears noting that this account of the Act’s limitations—that “if 
special rules for a substantive category of cases were needed, their creation would be a task for 
Congress,” id.—is in tension with the Supersession Clause and its seeming grant of authority to the 
rulemakers to supplant congressionally enacted procedures, including those targeted to particular 
substantive categories of cases. Professor Burbank wrote in a similar vein when commenting on 
Professor Carrington’s approach to the Enabling Act shortly after the reforms described above, 
explaining: “I believe that, under the original Enabling Act, the restrictions on court rulemaking 
should have been read to effect the purpose of allocating federal lawmaking power of the legislative 
type, not just to protect existing law, and certainly not just to protect state law.” Stephen B. Burbank, 
Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules 
Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1019. 
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proceeding, using Wal-Mart v. Dukes
19
 as an illustrative case. Dukes has 
been received as a watershed, with academic commentators treating the 
Court’s holdings on commonality and on Rule 23(b)(2) as paradigm-
shifting statements of class-action policy. There is no question that Dukes 
is a consequential case. But the academy has been too quick to assign the 
opinion broad trans-substantive meaning. The Court’s discussion of the 
commonality issue in Dukes is grounded in Title VII policy and speaks 
primarily to the federal common law of disparate impact remedies under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The handful of statements on Rule 23 and 
commonality play only an equivocal role in the analysis. The Court’s 
treatment of Rule 23(b)(2), in contrast, does speak to core questions of 
class-action policy. Even so, the substantive policies underlying the 
dispute played a major role in the Court’s determination that a (b)(2) 
action was unavailable, albeit a role that the Court itself left largely 
unexplored. The constraints that Dukes imposes upon class-action practice 
are inextricably tied to a series of express and implied holdings under Title 
VII and should be approached with that substantive focus in mind. 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes presented the Court with the largest proposed class 
action ever attempted under Title VII. Wal-Mart, the Nation’s largest 
private employer, stood accused of utilizing a nationwide management 
policy that consistently imposed a disparate impact upon female workers. 
The policy reposed broad discretion in store-level managers to employ 
their own “subjective criteria” in matters of hiring, advancement and 
termination of employees, and the plaintiffs claimed that such discretion 
produced a male-dominated workplace hostile to female employees. 
Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of current and former female 
employees who had been subject to these policies, numbering about one 
and a half million in total, claiming injunctive and declaratory relief, 
backpay, and punitive damages on behalf of the class. The district court 
certified the class and the en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) were satisfied and that the action could 
proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) as a class seeking “final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief . . . respecting the class as whole,” with 
the request for backpay characterized as incidental to the non-monetary 
relief.
20
 
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that divided 5–4 in one part 
and was unanimous in another. The Court divided on whether the 
 
 
 19. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 20. Id. at 2547–50. 
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plaintiffs’ action satisfied the requirement of commonality under Rule 
23(a), with the majority finding that Wal-Mart’s policy of reposing 
discretion in store-level managers did not create a sufficiently common 
issue for class certification. Speaking unanimously, the Court found that 
Rule 23(b)(2) was not an appropriate vehicle for certifying a class that 
sought individual backpay awards or individualized injunctions to 
reinstate particular employees. Commentators and lower federal courts 
have given the decision active attention in the year since it was rendered.
21
 
It is thus important to have a clear understanding of the elements of the 
Court’s ruling and the sources of authority from which they spring. 
Turning first to the divided portion of the opinion that speaks to Rule 
23(a), there are at least two components of the Court’s commonality 
analysis that can properly be termed pure questions of Rule 23 policy. 
First, in describing how cohesive a common issue must be among class 
members—and how dispositive the resolution of that issue must be to their 
claims—the Court adopts a formulation from Professor Richard Nagareda 
that focuses on the presence of “dissimilarities” within the suit and 
emphasizes “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common 
answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation” rather than merely 
raising common questions.
22
 Second, in discussing the evidentiary burden 
borne by the party seeking certification, the Court offers a strong 
statement of the plaintiff’s obligation to show affirmatively that Rule 23 is 
satisfied through the introduction of evidence that “convincingly 
establishes” its requirements.
23
 Both aspects of the Court’s holding have 
trans-substantive procedural impact. The one offers a formulation of 
commonality that may tighten certification analysis in future cases 
regardless of the substantive legal regime involved; the other sets a 
generally applicable evidentiary condition at the threshold of class 
certification. But the primary significance of the Court’s commonality 
analysis in Dukes relates to Title VII. 
Commonality analysis requires a court to examine the nature of the 
putative class claims asserted by the plaintiffs and the elements of proof 
 
 
 21. A Westlaw KeyCite request on the opinion performed on June 27, 2012 returned over 500 
reported court decisions citing to Dukes and well over 1,000 secondary sources. 
 22. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131–32 (2009) (italics in original)). As Justice Ginsburg 
correctly notes in her partial dissent, the quoted material is taken from a portion of Professor 
Nagareda’s article in which he has referenced, and appears still to be discussing, the requirement of 
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 23. Id. at 2551–52, 2554. 
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necessary to establish those claims. Questions of Rule 23 policy—in 
Dukes, whether a court should require only common questions or instead 
examine “the capacity of a proceeding to generate common answers apt to 
drive the resolution of the litigation”—must be coupled with questions of 
liability policy—what type of showing will establish liability in a Title VII 
disparate impact case, and what type of evidence is competent to make 
that showing? 
After its recitation of the Rule 23 standard, the Dukes Court offers an 
answer to those questions that sounds entirely in Title VII policy. The core 
of the class proceeding in Dukes was a company-wide policy, 
implemented by Wal-Mart in all of its stores, that reposed discretion on 
matters of hiring and promotion in store-level managers. Plaintiffs argued 
that the policy imposed a disparate impact upon women in its overall 
effect upon company personnel, whether by reinforcing unconscious bias 
among managers, masking acts of intentional discrimination, or making 
advancement within the workplace dependent upon social dynamics that 
disadvantaged women. The common question, and it was undeniably 
“common,” was the nature and extent of the effects imposed by that 
company-wide policy and whether those effects constituted actionable 
harms. The “capacity of [the] proceeding to generate common answers apt 
to drive the resolution of the litigation” depended upon the operative 
significance, under the controlling liability regime, of the features of the 
policy that were common to the entire company. 
The Court framed its commonality analysis with these principles, 
flagging the precise nature of the claimed harm under Title VII as its 
starting point: 
Title VII . . . can be violated in many ways—by intentional 
discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in 
disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of 
many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously, the 
mere claim by employees of the same company that they have 
suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII 
injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can 
productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a 
common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory 
bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, 
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide 
resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity 
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will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the 
claims in one stroke.
24
 
After reviewing the record from the certification hearing, the Court 
concluded that the evidence did not support the existence of a policy that 
was potentially actionable under Title VII and common to the entire class. 
 The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence 
convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s ‘‘policy’’ of allowing 
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its 
face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment 
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class 
action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices. 
It is also a very common and presumptively reasonable way of 
doing business—one that we have said ‘‘should itself raise no 
inference of discriminatory conduct.” 
 To be sure, we have recognized that, ‘‘in appropriate cases,’’ 
giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title 
VII liability under a disparate-impact theory—since ‘‘an employer’s 
undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking [can have] 
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible 
intentional discrimination.’’ But the recognition that this type of 
Title VII claim ‘‘can’’ exist does not lead to the conclusion that 
every employee in a company using a system of discretion has such 
a claim in common. To the contrary, left to their own devices most 
managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a 
corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-
neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that 
produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose to reward 
various attributes that produce disparate impact—such as scores on 
general aptitude tests or educational achievements. And still other 
managers may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces 
a sex-based disparity. In such a company, demonstrating the 
invalidity of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to 
demonstrate the invalidity of another’s. A party seeking to certify a 
nationwide class will be unable to show that all the employees’ Title 
 
 
 24. Id. at 2551. 
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VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to common 
questions.
25
 
The Court’s confidence about what most companies and managers 
would surely do if left to their own devices may provoke skepticism, and 
the merits of its Title VII analysis may be subject to debate. What is 
important for present purposes is to recognize that it is in fact Title VII 
policy that drives the Court’s analysis. If Wal-Mart had an express policy 
that encouraged stores to prioritize men over women in hiring and 
promotion, that policy would itself violate Title VII and be subject to a 
common, classwide injunctive remedy. This is true even if, “left to their 
own devices,” many managers would disregard the policy’s 
encouragement and make decisions based purely on merit. Such a policy 
would embody intentional discrimination in defining the opportunities 
available to prospective employees, and that suffices to make out a Title 
VII claim on a common basis.
26
 Just so, if the company had a policy that 
favored workers with greater height and upper-body strength in positions 
where those characteristics have no occupational justification, the policy 
would be subject to a common, classwide injunctive remedy for its 
unjustified disparate impact, even if many managers would disregard the 
policy and instead “select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for 
hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” Once 
again, the express policy produces a disparate impact sufficient to warrant 
injunctive intervention under Title VII.
27
 
Thus, the Court’s holding does not speak primarily to the content of 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Rather, that holding sounds in the 
liability policies of Title VII. If the Court had found that a company-wide 
policy of reposing discretion in store-level managers could support a Title 
VII injunction because of its capacity to impose a disparate impact upon 
women, regardless of how that policy plays out in particular stores—just 
as the express preference and height-and-weight examples described above 
could violate Title VII for their intentional discrimination and disparate 
 
 
 25. Id. at 2554 (citations omitted). 
 26. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (“[I]n enacting Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which 
create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”). 
 27. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1977) (holding that height and weight 
restrictions that disproportionately exclude female employees “establish a prima facie case for 
discrimination” if “the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly 
discriminatory pattern” and disavowing any “requirement . . . that a statistical showing of 
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants”). 
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effects, even in the face of store-level idiosyncrasy and variation—then the 
fact of the discretionary policy would itself have constituted a common 
issue, as “all the employees’ Title VII claims [would] in fact depend on 
the answers to common questions.”
28
 The Court’s holding that such a 
claim could not be certified against Wal-Mart on a company-wide basis 
constituted a pronouncement on the content of Title VII’s liability rule—
the circumstances in which a discretionary policy will or will not support a 
finding of disparate impact—and spoke to the commonality requirement of 
Rule 23 in only a derivative fashion. 
The Court’s analysis of Rule 23(b)(2) and individually tailored 
remedies, in contrast, sounds primarily in the policies of Rule 23 itself. It 
is a trans-substantive procedural ruling. Even so, substantive liability 
policy does play an indirect role in the Court’s analysis. But the Court 
leaves that role largely unexplicated. 
In the part of its opinion that speaks unanimously, the Court rejects 
Rule 23(b)(2) as a vehicle for certifying claims for backpay under Title 
VII. Disapproving the more expansive uses to which some lower federal 
courts have put that provision, the Dukes Court limits the reach of Rule 
23(b)(2) to cases in which “a single injunction or declaratory judgment 
would provide relief to each member of the class” and holds it to be 
unavailable “when each individual class member would be entitled to a 
different injunction or declaratory judgment” or “would be entitled to an 
individualized award of monetary damages.”
29
 The Court leaves open the 
question whether (b)(2) could be used in cases where claims for injunctive 
or declaratory relief “predominated” over paired claims for monetary 
damages, though it indicates strong disapproval of such hybrid actions and 
makes clear that their ambit would be narrow in any event.
30
 
 
 
 28. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 29. Id. at 2557 (italics in original). 
 30. Id. at 2559–61. Unfortunately, the Court also repeats the Shutts fallacy, citing Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), for the proposition that “[i]n the context of a class 
action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due 
process.” Id. at 2559. Shutts decided no such thing. The Court’s 1985 ruling answered a question about 
state adjudicatory power: whether a state court may entertain a nationwide class action involving 
absent class members with no prior connection to the forum. The Court answered in the affirmative on 
the strength of the individual notice and opt-out opportunities required by state law, concluding that 
class members who declined to opt out had manifested sufficient consent to be bound by the forum. In 
a suit where the adjudicatory reach of the court is not in question, this holding has no direct 
application, and the Court has held in another seminal opinion, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, that 
individual damages claims can sometimes be compromised in a representative proceeding with no 
individualized notice or opt-out opportunity. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). I explore these issues at length in 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class 
Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076–80 (2008).  
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In contrast to its discussion of commonality, the Court’s analysis in this 
section of its opinion is concerned almost entirely with Rule 23 itself. The 
Court discusses the history and origins of Rule 23 as a lens through which 
to scrutinize the proper function of subsection (b)(2).
31
 It explains that the 
text and procedural policies bound up in subsection (b)(2) would be 
frustrated by allowing its use for the certification of individual damages 
claims, as it refers to “injunctive relief” that is “appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.”
32
 And it points to the coordinate features of a 23(b)(3) 
class action that are designed to safeguard the interests of class members 
when individual damages claims are in play, concluding that the integrity 
of the Rule would be subverted if subsection (b)(2) could be pressed into 
service to certify claims for individualized monetary damages without the 
operation of those safeguards.
33
 
These pronouncements upon Rule 23(b)(2) do not depend upon the 
particularities of the claims sought to be certified. They speak in a trans-
substantive fashion to the structure, purpose and operation of the Rule and 
the process values of notice, litigant autonomy, and opportunity to be 
heard that are addressed in the Rule’s respective provisions. There should 
be no doubt about the lasting significance of that part of the Court’s 
holding to class action litigation across different substantive legal 
contexts.
34
 
Nonetheless, there is one portion of the Court’s holding that does 
depend upon an assessment of liability policy under Title VII. The Court 
correctly links this part of its Rule 23 analysis to the Rules Enabling Act, 
but it fails to provide an adequate account of the underlying substantive 
law. 
Having concluded that Rule 23(b)(2) is only available in cases 
involving requests for relief that can readily be crafted on behalf of the 
class as a whole, rather than relief that must be individually tailored to 
each class member, the Court holds that requests for backpay under Title 
VII do not satisfy that requirement. Under the statute’s remedial 
provisions, the Court explains, “Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized 
determinations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay”—specifically, 
the opportunity to show as to each employee “that it took an adverse 
 
 
 31. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58. 
 32. Id. at 2557. 
 33. Id. at 2558–59. 
 34. Professor Jack Coffee emphasized the relative importance of the Court’s 23(b)(2) holding in 
an early response to the decision. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future (if Any) of Class Litigation After 
‘Wal-Mart,’ NAT’L L.J., Sept. 12, 2011. 
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employment action against [the] employee for any reason other than 
discrimination.”
35
 The Ninth Circuit had approved the use of a sample-
based approach to resolve these defenses, under which “[t]he percentage 
of claims determined to be valid would . . . be applied to the entire 
remaining class, and the number of (presumptively) valid claims thus 
derived would be multiplied by the average backpay award in the sample 
set to arrive at the entire class recovery” without the need for 
individualized determinations in each case.
36
 Rejecting this form of “Trial 
by Formula,” the Court found that a district court was not empowered to 
administer Title VII claims in a manner that altered the defendant’s ability 
to litigate statutory defenses employee by employee, even in cases 
involving huge numbers of claims where so many individual hearings 
would be impractical. Treating the question as one of procedure versus 
substance, the Court proclaimed: “Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids 
interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ 
a class cannot be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be 
entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.”
37
 
The Court is correct to say that the Rules Enabling Act would forbid a 
court from relying upon Rule 23 as the source of its authority in crafting a 
class proceeding that would substantially modify the rights that the parties 
would enjoy in a purely individual case. But the Court is incorrect in 
concluding that the holding in Dukes necessarily flows from that premise. 
There is another source of authority that could take into account the larger 
litigation context—a huge number of claimants, and the impracticality of 
providing relief without some form of aggregate proceeding—in 
determining whether it is appropriate to structure a class action in which 
the defendant’s ability to assert individual defenses as to each claimant is 
altered: the underlying substantive law itself. 
Professor Burbank and I addressed a related issue in our analysis of 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance,
38
 a diversity 
case in which the Court found Rule 23 to preempt a New York statute, 
CPLR § 901(b), that forbade class actions for causes of action affording 
statutory or penalty damages unless the statute creating the cause of action 
specifically authorized classwide relief. Justice Scalia’s lead opinion is 
highly formalistic, relying upon the unconvincing proposition that class 
certification has only an “incidental” effect on the dynamics of litigation 
 
 
 35. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2560–61. 
 36. Id. at 2561. 
 37. Id. (citations omitted). 
 38. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
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and settlement as the basis for its conclusion that Rule 23 presents no 
problems under the Enabling Act so long as the formal elements of the 
underlying cause of action remain unchanged in a class action.
39
 As we 
explained in that earlier article, it seems likely that “the majority simply 
could not see a way to uphold the facial validity of Rule 23 while at the 
same time acknowledging the industry-changing impact of class action 
practice.”
40
 But it is not necessary to retreat to a land of fancy to preserve 
Rule 23 within the Enabling Act structure. 
The solution to the seeming dilemma caused by Rule 23’s dramatic 
impact upon substantive liability and regulatory regimes is that Rule 
23 is not the source of the aggregate-liability policies that generate 
that impact, and it never has been. Rather, courts must look to the 
substantive liability and regulatory regimes of state and federal law 
in determining whether aggregate relief is appropriate and 
consistent with the goals of that underlying law. Rule 23 is merely 
the mechanism for carrying an aggregate proceeding into effect 
when the underlying law supports that result. It is an important 
mechanism, and one that makes its own controlling policy choices 
for the federal courts about such matters as notice, opportunity to 
opt out, and immediate appeal of certification. But Rule 23 does not 
set policy on the propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of 
accomplishing regulatory goals—and it could not possibly do so.
41
 
In Shady Grove, the plurality argued that a Federal Rule could preempt 
any state liability or regulatory policy that was enforced through a 
mechanism that utilized “procedural” language. The majority comprising 
Justice Stevens and the four Ginsburg dissenters, however, recognized that 
liability policies are sometimes bound up with mechanisms that look 
procedural in form. The result in the case hinged upon Justice Stevens’s 
conclusion that CPLR § 901(b) was not such a provision.
42
 
 
 
 39. Id. at 1443 (Scalia, J., for himself and Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.). 
 40. Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 65 (2010). 
 41. Id. at 21. 
 42. It is unfortunately the case that the Ginsburg/Stevens majority discussed these issues 
exclusively in terms of state substantive policies, perpetuating the fallacy that the limitations of the 
Rules Enabling Act are particularly directed to state law and federalism values, rather than applying 
equally to federal question cases and primarily implicating separation-of-powers concerns, see Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449–50 (“It is important to observe that the balance Congress has struck turns, in 
part, on the nature of the state law that is being displaced by a federal rule.”) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment), though Justice Ginsburg was more careful to specify that this 
way of framing the issue obtains only in diversity cases, see id. at 1460–64. For a discussion of these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1043 
 
 
 
 
In Dukes, the Rule 23(b)(2) question presents an analytical mirror-
image of the question presented in Shady Grove. Rule 23 is a procedural 
mechanism constrained by the Enabling Act. Title VII embodies a set of 
regulatory and liability policies regarding discrimination in the workplace. 
Having concluded that plaintiffs seeking certification cannot proceed 
under section (b)(2) when each class member’s claim would require an 
individualized remedy, the Court correctly turns to Title VII to determine 
whether the liability policies embodied in the statute could accommodate 
that requirement. Thereafter, however, the Court’s opinion suffers from 
inadequate analysis. 
The Court concludes that it would be inconsistent with the liability 
policies reflected in Title VII to permit the resolution of backpay claims 
without giving Wal-Mart an opportunity to raise individualized defenses to 
the claims of each absentee. It relies for that conclusion upon two sources 
of authority. First, the Court points to the statute itself, which creates an 
affirmative defense for employers who can demonstrate a non-
discriminatory reason for taking adverse employment action. The statutory 
text, however, does not specify the form or method of that defense. The 
provision is directed only to the permissible scope of a court’s order: 
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of 
an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, 
or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to 
him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement 
or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than 
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
43
 
The Court then points to its own statements in International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States
44
 (which in turn rely upon McDonnell 
 
 
matters, including an account of the differing roles that federal courts play as expositors of common 
law in difficult Rules Enabling Act cases when proceeding in diversity versus federal question 
jurisdiction, see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 48–51. 
 The Dukes decision offers an implicit corrective to this misframing of the Enabling Act when it 
invokes the Act as a limitation on the range of interpretations that are permissible for Rule 23(b)(2) in 
that case, since Dukes is a federal statutory dispute in which only federal substantive rights are 
threatened with abridgment or modification. See supra text accompanying notes 30–32. The Court 
does not flag the issue for particular attention, but the invocation of the Enabling Act is significant 
nonetheless as a counterweight to the frequent occasions on which the Court has implied that the Act is 
primarily aimed at safeguarding federalism values. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 43. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Section 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A). 
 44. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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Douglas Corp. v. Green
45
 and Franks
46
) to describe the “procedure[s] for 
trying pattern-or-practice cases that give[] effect to these statutory 
requirements,” procedures that provide an opportunity for the defendant to 
“raise any individual affirmative defenses it may have”
47
 against each 
claimant for separate adjudication. 
Teamsters, McDonnell Douglas, and Franks—and now Dukes—are 
federal common-law rulings. In each case, the Court has taken portions of 
a regulatory statute that do not specify the methods of evaluating proof or 
administering remedies and set forth a body of judge-made law designed 
to carry into effect the express provisions of the statute and the policies 
underlying them. At the very least, the rulings are robust interstitial federal 
common law, filling in gaps in the statute that Congress must have 
contemplated the courts would go on to specify. But they also constitute 
affirmative statements of policy by the federal courts, making substantive 
decisions within the framework Congress set forth about the balance 
between reasonable opportunities for plaintiff recovery, on the one hand, 
and protection of defendants from unwarranted liability or settlement 
pressure, on the other. And the Court has been attentive to the impact of 
Rule 23 upon those competing priorities when setting federal policy for 
Title VII class actions. 
In Franks, for example, the Court broadened the forms of class-wide 
relief available to employees seeking vested status in a seniority system as 
part of the remedy required to make them whole for past acts of racial 
discrimination. Citing portions of a Conference Committee report 
attending the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the Court noted the report’s 
enjoinder that courts “‘fashion the most complete relief possible’” and 
found in it “emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to 
fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to 
effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial 
 
 
 45. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas introduced the burden-shifting framework by 
which a Title VII claimant can make out a prima facie case of discrimination and then shift the burden 
to the employer to identify a neutral reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 802–04. It also 
validated the use of “statistics as to [a company’s] employment policy and practice” as a means of 
determining whether a refusal to hire a particular job applicant “conformed to a general pattern of 
discrimination against blacks,” though the Court cautioned that, in an action brought by an individual 
claimant, “general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an 
individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for 
refusing to rehire.” Id. at 804–05 & n.19. 
 46. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
 47. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1045 
 
 
 
 
discrimination in hiring.”
48
 The Court responded to the charge that 
classwide seniority relief could result in unfair burdens upon innocent 
employees whose seniority would thereby be lessened by emphasizing that 
“[a]ttainment of a great national policy . . . must not be confined within 
narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in 
ordinary private controversies.”
49
 Validating the propriety of “class-based 
seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal hiring discrimination,” the 
Court reserved the possibility that “[c]ircumstances peculiar to the 
individual case may, of course, justify the modification or withholding of 
seniority relief,” but only when such exceptions were recognized “for 
reasons that would not if applied generally undermine the purposes of 
Title VII.”
50
 
Franks speaks not only to the availability of a particular remedy under 
Title VII (inclusion in a seniority system) but the administration of that 
remedy on a class-wide basis and the resulting impact upon the purposes 
underlying Title VII. In a similar fashion, lower federal courts have 
grappled with the question whether an individual non-class plaintiff in a 
workplace discrimination case can proceed on a Teamsters pattern-or-
practice theory, in which the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by 
showing “that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or 
policy followed by an employer or group of employers.”
51
 Some courts 
have found that this method of proof is available to private litigants only 
on a class-wide basis,
52
 while others permit individual plaintiffs to rely 
upon pattern-or-practice statistical methods provided that they are 
sufficiently probative of the reasons underlying the adverse employment 
action.
53
 In both cases, one sees what Professor Burbank and I have 
described as “the application of Rule 23 [serving as] the occasion for the 
Court to implement class action policies in federal common law that it was 
 
 
 48. Franks, 424 U.S. at 763–64 (quoting SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 1746, 
ACCOMPANYING THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 CONFERENCE REPORT, 118 
CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)). 
 49. Id. at 777–78 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 779–80. 
 51. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360. 
 52. See, e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 Fed. Appx. 707, 716–17 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that “the pattern-or-practice method should be reserved for government actions or plaintiffs in class 
actions to establish the presence of a discriminatory policy, rather than an individual claim”); Lowery 
v. Circuit City, 158 F.3d 742, 759–64 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting pattern-or-practice method in 
individual Title VII case). 
 53. See, e.g., Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 766–67 (3d Cir. 1989) (permitting use 
of pattern-or-practice style statistical evidence and explaining that “in individual disparate treatment 
cases such as this, statistical evidence . . . need not be so finely tuned” because the claim does not 
depend upon demonstrating “systemic employment practices”) (citation omitted). 
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otherwise authorized to make”
54
—whether the federal court is 
implementing the substantive federal policies mobilized by a statute like 
Title VII, or utilizing their authority as independent tribunals to articulate 
rules on such matters as the tolling of a limitations period as in American 
Pipe
55
 or a rule of preclusion as in Cooper.
56
 
In Dukes, the Court fails to address the significance of the aggregate 
litigation context in assessing the content and operation of these federal 
common-law policies. Wal-Mart v. Dukes presented claims of nationwide 
scope brought against the country’s largest private employer, alleging a 
pattern of substantial harm to female employees as a consequence of the 
employer’s decision to eschew objective standards for hiring and 
promotion across the company. It is possible that the purposes underlying 
Title VII could only be faithfully carried into effect in such a case through 
a nationwide class proceeding that was comprehensive in scope. Insofar as 
Title VII aims to provide relief to workers who have suffered harm as a 
result of discriminatory practices, and also to force employers to 
internalize the actual harm caused by past wrongs, a nationwide 
proceeding might provide the only practical and economically viable path 
in response to a pervasive but inchoate policy in a massive national 
company. And insofar as Title VII aims to eliminate discriminatory 
practices prospectively, a proceeding that scrutinizes that policy and crafts 
relief on a company-wide basis may be a necessary tool. At least, so the 
plaintiffs argued, and those arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
If clear statutory text requires individualized assessments that would 
make a nationwide class action impossible to certify, then a federal 
common law response is foreclosed. Section 706(g)’s references to the 
“reinstatement of an individual” and an affirmative defense if adverse 
action toward “such individual” was non-discriminatory might require 
individual hearings and foreclose a (b)(2) class action. But there is room 
for disagreement about just how clear a mandate is imposed by the text 
alone. If, instead, prior rulings about the requirement for individualized 
hearings are the product of federal common law building upon 
indeterminate statutory language, then a case like Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
provides an occasion for revisiting those federal common law rulings 
 
 
 54. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 50. 
 55. American Pipe & Constr. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (establishing tolling rule for putative 
class members in actions filed under Rule 23). 
 56. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (setting preclusion rule for 
individual claimants in Title VII discrimination case following unsuccessful prosecution of a pattern or 
practice claim on a classwide basis). 
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rather than merely applying them to deny relief. The balance struck in 
prior cases between reasonable opportunities for recovery by plaintiffs and 
protection of defendants from unwarranted liability have proceeded from a 
set of assumptions about litigation dynamics and industry conditions. If 
those assumptions do not obtain in a new commercial context, then the 
same authority that gave rise to the Teamsters framework in the first place 
could require reexamination.
57
 
In such a case, the aggregate litigation context would matter to some 
aspects of the parties’ claims and remedies. This is not because Rule 23 
mandates a reexamination of Title VII policy—it does not, and cannot 
under the Enabling Act—but rather because the underlying liability 
policies themselves call for that reexamination. As Professor Kaplan 
explained when addressing an analogous analytical question relating to 
subject-matter jurisdiction in class actions, “[l]ike other innovations from 
time to time introduced into the Civil Rules, those as to class actions 
change the total situation on which the statutes and theories regarding 
subject matter jurisdiction are brought to bear.”
58
 Both circumstances 
evince what Professor Burbank and I have called the “tension between the 
limits of the Enabling Act and the power of the Federal Rules to shape or 
catalyze developments in the underlying law.”
59
 
I do not argue here that such alterations to the federal common law of 
remedies under Title VII were warranted in Dukes, or that the Court’s 
ultimate holding regarding the availability of certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) was incorrect. A proper treatment of those questions exceeds the 
scope of this Article. But it is these questions that the Court should have 
addressed in the second half of its analysis. The constraints on class action 
practice that Dukes imposes are defined by the interplay between Rule 23 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Whether those constraints represent 
good policy or bad under that landmark statute, they are largely substance-
specific and should be recognized as such. 
 
 
 57. Professor Sherry makes a similar observation in her discussion of Dukes, expressing 
skepticism at the plaintiffs’ underlying substantive goals. See Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered 
at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26–27 (“I suggest that . . . [the plaintiffs’] decision to 
proceed as a class action in Wal-Mart can be explained as a desire to change the substantive law of 
employment discrimination. The allegation of a culture of discrimination was essentially an attempt to 
write into Title VII the concepts of structural discrimination and implicit bias. . . . But such a theory 
distorts Title VII beyond recognition.”). 
 58. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399–400 (1967). 
 59. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 56. 
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III. LIABILITY POLICY AS AFFIRMATIVE AUTHORITY FOR MANAGERIAL 
JUDGING: THE 9/11 FIRST-RESPONDERS LITIGATION 
The underlying substantive law need not operate only as a constraint 
upon procedural options in a complex case. The liability policies 
governing a dispute can sometimes authorize, or even demand, a 
managerial role on the part of the trial court. This is true in class litigation, 
where the underlying substantive law can take account of the importance 
of aggregate relief in defining the rights of parties if authoritative policy-
makers so decide, as in the scenario involving Title VII and Rule 23(b)(2) 
described above. And it is also true in non-class litigation, including the 
increasingly important phenomenon of mass-tort aggregation. 
The current generation of scholarship on aggregate litigation typically 
draws a sharp distinction between class actions and non-class aggregate 
proceedings. Particularly with respect to review of proposed settlements 
for adequacy or fairness, the governing assumption, reflected in the 
American Law Institute’s Principles on Complex Litigation, is that the 
Rule 23 mandate requiring judicial approval of settlements marks class 
actions as a qualitatively different type of proceeding, conferring authority 
upon judges that is unavailable in non-class cases.
60
 This analytical 
mindset overstates both the power and the singularity of Rule 23. Rule 23 
is a muscular provision that places important tools in the hands of district 
judges, but those tools can only be employed when they are consistent 
with the liability policies of the governing substantive law. By the same 
token, the Federal Rules are not the only source of authority that a judge 
 
 
 60. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
(2010). The ALI Principles begin with the assumption that judicial approval of settlements is only 
required in class action proceedings, see id. § 3.01(a)–(b), emphasize that “[s]ignificant differences 
between class and non-class cases require that these two types of cases be treated differently for 
purposes of settlement,” id. § 3.15, and then set forth a set of conditions that should be met for an 
aggregate settlement to be enforceable but assign “[r]esponsibility for compliance with the 
prerequisites for the enforceability of [such] an agreement” to “the claimants’ lawyer.” Id. § 3.17(f). It 
is of course true that there are differences between these types of proceedings that require close 
attention, but the ALI’s sharply categorical treatment of these distinctions is noteworthy. See also 
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 
(2011) (developing argument that individual party consent must be the touchstone for the types of 
judicial management and supervision that characterizes class litigation). 
 Professor Robert Bone is one important exception to this scholarly trend. Bone recently penned a 
critique of the sharp doctrinal demarcations often attributed to the divide between class and non-class 
proceedings, though his main focus was preclusion doctrine and the analytical foundations of his 
critique were quite different from those I explore here. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of 
Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 577 (2011). 
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can draw upon when called to carry into effect the liability policies 
underlying a complex dispute. 
The consolidated proceedings overseen by Judge Alvin Hellerstein in 
the 9/11 first-responders litigation dramatically illustrate the role of the 
substantive law in authorizing management and innovation by a district 
judge beyond that expressly contemplated by the Federal Rules. It is 
possible that the singular nature of the statutory framework governing the 
proceedings before Judge Hellerstein will limit the immediate precedential 
impact of his rulings. Even if so, the distinctive features of that statutory 
framework provide a rich opportunity for challenging the artificial lines of 
separation typically drawn between the role of the judge in a class action 
and in non-class proceedings. 
The first-responders litigation arose as part of the federal government’s 
multi-stage response to the death and injury wrought by the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The use of hijacked commercial airliners 
as weapons of mass destruction posed an existential threat to the U.S. 
airline industry, which faced the prospect of incalculable liability for the 
harm done by the attacks themselves and a crisis in public confidence in 
the safety and viability of air travel. Congress responded by enacting a 
statutory scheme, the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization 
Act,
61
 or ATSSSA, to protect the airline industry from bankruptcy and to 
provide compensation to the injured survivors of the attacks and the 
families of deceased victims. 
The most well known component of ATSSSA, the Victim 
Compensation Fund or VCF, set up a no-fault system overseen by special 
master Kenneth Feinberg that enabled eligible beneficiaries to receive 
compensation for their harm in return for agreeing to waive the right to sue 
in tort.
62
 As originally structured, the VCF covered individuals who were 
killed or physically injured in the attacks or in their “immediate 
aftermath,” a designation that extended no more than 96 hours after the 
crashes occurred.
63
 
 
 
 61. Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). 
 62. See id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing that individuals who submit a claim under the VCF 
thereby waive the right to file a civil action in any U.S. court for damages sustained as a result of the 
air crashes). 
 63. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re 
World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining scope and operation of VCF and 
related provisions of ATSSSA). 
 Ken Feinberg provides an indispensable account of his experience administering the VCF in 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL 
UPHEAVAL 41–62 (2012). 
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Individuals who suffered physical injury as a result of the attacks but 
who were not present within 96 hours of the crashes, including many 
rescue and response personnel who began work outside that window of 
time, were not eligible for participation in the no-fault VCF. Their tort 
claims posed potentially serious threats to the airline industry, the City of 
New York, and the owners of the World Trade Center property site where 
rebuilding would need to occur. ATSSSA thus extended the liability 
protections it provided those defendants to cover such claims as well, even 
though the injured parties would not have the opportunity to participate in 
the no-fault compensation scheme. In lieu of a compensation fund, 
ATSSSA permitted these claims to proceed in tort, but subject to extensive 
and coordinated regulation. The first-responders litigation was the 
resulting proceeding in which these claims were adjudicated.
64
 
To govern the first-responder claims, ATSSSA created exclusive 
remedy provisions, imposed caps on total damages, and established 
specialized rules for jurisdiction and venue—a set of provisions that were 
comprehensive in scope and preemptive in effect. Far from being just 
another mass tort multidistrict litigation that happened to arise in a 
singular factual context, the first-responders litigation was the product of a 
targeted statute containing substantive aggregate liability policies. Those 
policies must be considered as a whole to appreciate their full import: 
Exclusive Federal Cause of Action: ATSSSA created a federal cause of 
action that preempted all other state and federal provisions as “the 
exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent 
crashes of [the 9/11] flights.”
65
 This federal cause of action incorporated 
state law by reference as a standard in defining the liability rule, but it did 
so with the caveat that any such law not be “inconsistent with or 
preempted by Federal law.”
66
 
Caps on Liability: Under ATSSSA’s exclusive federal remedy, the 
total damages available for all claimants against airlines and airports, 
aircraft manufacturers, or persons with a property interest in the World 
Trade Center were capped at “the limits of liability insurance coverage 
maintained by” those entities;
67
 and the total damages for all claimants 
against the City of New York were capped at three hundred and fifty 
 
 
 64. See Hellerstein et al., supra note 6, at 132–42 (describing the series of decisions by which the 
district court came to define the scope of the proceeding it would hear, the terms of eligibility for 
participating in that proceeding, and the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed). 
 65. ATSSSA § 408(b)(1). 
 66. Id. § 408(b)(2). 
 67. Id. § 408(a)(1). 
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million dollars (or the city’s insurance coverage, if that number was 
greater).
68
 Any damages claimed against the specified defendants that 
exceed these levels were extinguished. 
Mandatory Jurisdiction and Venue: Having created a limited fund from 
which all claimants seeking an adjudicatory remedy must pursue their 
claims, the statute required that every claim be heard before a single court, 
ensuring that the entirety of the first-responders litigation would be heard 
as a comprehensive consolidated action: “The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim . . . resulting from or 
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”
69
 
Although the statute did not specify that all claims must be heard before 
the same judge, that eventuality was easy to predict in light of established 
MDL practice, which favors the consolidation of related complex claims 
before a single transferee judge.
70
 In this connection, one should note the 
different treatment that choice of law and jurisdiction receive under 
ATSSSA. Although the statute permits different state laws to apply as the 
point of reference for liability in each first-responder case, selecting the 
law that the state of each respective crash site would apply (subject to 
preemption or inconsistency with federal law), it mandates that all claims 
be heard in the Southern District of New York, emphasizing the 
importance that ATSSSA attached to coordination. The statute contains a 
targeted directive for a consolidated proceeding for all September 11 
claims. 
This comprehensive set of statutory provisions necessarily called for an 
approach to the management and adjudication of the first-responder claims 
that prioritized the overall fairness of recovery and the allocation of 
benefits among claimants as a controlling principle in the litigation. 
ATSSSA forged a substantive legal relationship among the first 
responders. The ability of any one claimant to recover was dependent upon 
the amount obtained by others from the limited fund, and a lack of 
 
 
 68. Id. § 408(a)(3). 
 69. Id. § 408(b)(3). The “resulting from or relating to” language is broad, apparently intending to 
extend to the fullest extent possible under Article III in sweeping claims relating to the September 11 
attacks into the Southern District of New York. 
 70. While the MDL statute speaks of transfer to “a judge or judges,” ordinary practice since the 
statute’s inception has been to transfer cases to a single transferee judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b); see, 
e.g., Hon. Andrew A. Caffrey, The Role of the Transferee Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 69 F.R.D. 
289 (1976) (remarks of Chief Judge Caffrey at a meeting of transferee judges, referring passim to 
individual transferee judges as the recipients of MDL cases). I have conducted recent conversations 
with members of the MDL panel that have been to the same effect. 
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coordination in the award and timing of individual recoveries or 
settlements could have compromised the ability of some responders to 
recover at all if the limited fund was exhausted prematurely. Such 
circumstances have long been recognized as justifying the type of judicial 
supervision mandated in the class-action setting by Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and 
its correlative provisions. In this case, ATSSSA created those 
circumstances as a matter of targeted liability policy, not simply the 
application of a general liability rule to an unusual factual scenario. 
The first-responder claims were not a class proceeding. They were not 
governed by Rule 23. But Rule 23 does not embody some expressio unius 
principle that forecloses a district court from employing its managerial 
tools outside the context of a class action, particularly when the 
substantive law calls for such judicial supervision. To suggest that the 
specification of certain managerial tools under Rule 23 forecloses a district 
judge from employing similar tools in non-class cases is to misunderstand 
the structure and operation of Rule 23. 
In a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action, the requirements for judicial 
assessment and approval of any proposed settlement serve a dual function. 
They safeguard the interests of absentees who have no voice in the 
litigation, a distinct requirement of class litigation. But they also serve to 
ensure that the consolidation of claims effectuated by a class proceeding 
will not operate to the collective detriment of plaintiffs claiming against a 
limited fund. A case involving massive coordination of individual claims 
subject to a collective damages cap squarely implicates this second 
purpose, even if it does not raise formal concerns about the interests of 
absentees. Rule 23 does not purport to occupy the field of judicial 
management in consolidated actions when concerns arise over the impact 
of consolidation on the rights of claimants in non-class proceedings. 
Judge Hellerstein’s federal common law powers provided him with 
sufficient authority to take actions aimed at ensuring that the policies 
underlying ATSSSA would be given effect through the consolidated 
proceeding before him. Those underlying liability policies demanded 
compensation that was fairly allocated and adequate in amount for the first 
responders claiming under the limited fund. The imperative for fairly 
allocated compensation proceeds from ATSSSA’s imposition of a 
damages cap and its consolidation of all claims before a single court, 
which made the claimants’ ability to recover wholly interdependent and 
necessarily called for an allocative approach. And the imperative for 
compensation that was adequate in amount reflects the trade-off that 
ATSSSA imposed when it capped the damages available to first 
responders and extinguished their claims under state law in order to secure 
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the widely distributed public benefit of a financially solvent airline 
industry, a healthy New York City, and property owners who were willing 
and able to proceed with the reconstruction of the World Trade Center site. 
The approach I suggest here—analyzing the managerial powers of a 
court in light of the substantive law that governs the dispute before it—
finds ample antecedent in the caselaw. Consider the noted opinion of 
Judge Lord in United States v. Reserve Mining Co. concerning requests for 
intervention by private and governmental entities in an abatement 
proceeding brought by the federal government against a mining company 
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
71
 The governing statute 
required that the court take into account a wide variety of materials 
encompassing “such . . . evidence, including that related to the alleged 
violation of the [pollution] standards, as it deems necessary” to the 
complete resolution of the dispute.
72
 Given that substantive mandate, 
Judge Lord found: 
The role of a court [hearing such an abatement suit], because of the 
nature of the proceedings and considerations which must be 
reviewed and undertaken pursuant to the statute, transcends 
ordinary civil litigation and makes a reviewing court more of an 
administrative tribunal than a court in an ordinary adversary civil 
case.
73
  
Using this principle as his guide, Judge Lord concluded that Rule 24’s 
requirement that intervenors-as-of-right show an “interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action”
74
 must be read 
“as an inclusionary rather than exclusionary device” in a Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act abatement action.
75
 Judge Lord’s opinion is cited in 
the literature as an example of intervention analysis that properly takes 
into account the public-law context of the inquiry.
76
 In the first-responders 
 
 
 71. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972); see also The Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160 et seq. (repealed 1972). I thank Steve Burbank for 
suggesting a discussion of Judge Lord’s opinion. 
 72. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (repealed 1972). 
 73. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413. 
 74. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). The 2007 restyling of the Rules changed “which” to “that” in the 
quoted text. 
 75. Reserve Mining, 56 F.R.D. at 413. 
 76. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 328 n.339 (1989). Judge Lord also had distinguished antecedents in this 
approach to intervention. In his classic article on the subject, Professor Shapiro emphasized that the 
“interest” requirement in Rule 24(a) does not impose a uniform and rigid test but rather must be read 
in light of the substantive legal setting and the impact of a proposed intervener on the litigation. 
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litigation, the necessity of a substance-specific approach to the district 
court’s managerial decisions under ATSSSA was patent. 
Nonetheless, the academic and critical commentary of Judge 
Hellerstein’s management of the first-responders litigation has been 
remarkably inattentive to the statutory framework within which the Judge 
was operating. One extensive treatment of the issue in a Seton Hall Law 
Review article is illustrative.
77
 The author, Jeremy Grabill, approaches 
judicial review of mass non-class settlements from a libertarian 
perspective, identifying litigant autonomy as the value of primary 
importance in safeguarding the interests of mass-tort non-absentee 
claimants. According to Grabill, individual consent should be the only 
basis for a judge to exercise review and approval authority of a settlement 
in such a case.
78
 I disagree with Grabill’s approach, but his analysis is 
thoughtful and careful. In crafting his arguments about non-class litigation, 
Grabill focuses particular attention on three case studies: the two 
pharmaceutical litigations that arose out of alleged injuries from Baycol 
and Vioxx, and the 9/11 first-responders litigation. As a point of contrast 
to these cases, Grabill provides an overview of federal statutory regimes 
that expressly require or authorize judicial review of non-class settlements, 
including the compromise of claims in federal bankruptcy, environmental 
remediation actions under CERCLA, and employment claims under the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
79
 Throughout his discussion of litigation 
practice under these statutory schemes, Grabill focuses attention on the 
specific liability policies that require or justify aggressive judicial 
management, including approval of settlements. 
In his discussion of Baycol, Vioxx, and the first responders, however, 
such attention to underlying liability policies is absent. In discussing these 
cases, Grabill focuses attention on the absence of the factors that he 
believes justify active judicial management in bankruptcy and other 
 
 
[T]he reference in Rule 24 and in some statutes to an “interest” suggests that the test is a 
simple one, but that notion quickly fades when one struggles with the cases. . . . Whether a 
sufficient interest exists to make intervention appropriate calls for considerable and careful 
judgment, and perhaps a little faith as well, with attention to such factors as the legal and 
practical availability of other remedies, the contribution that the prospective intervener can 
make to the litigation, the immediacy and degree of the harm threatened, and the advantages 
of avoiding multiplicity of actions. 
David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 721, 740 (1968). 
 77. Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 123 (2012). 
 78. Id. at 127, 163–64. 
 79. Id. at 130–38. 
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proceedings. But when offering an affirmative account of the policies at 
stake in his case studies, in particular the first-responders case, Grabill 
employs what Judge Posner might call Esperanto liability law
80
—a 
homogenized description of mass-tort liability policy with no attention to 
the singular liability-shaping features of ATSSSA: 
Though it is a creature of ATSSSA, the World Trade Center 
Disaster Site litigation can be thought of as an MDL proceeding, or 
perhaps five related mini-MDLs all before the same judge. And just 
as in the Baycol and Vioxx litigations, the plaintiffs’ claims in the 
World Trade Center Disaster Site litigation were not certified as 
class actions, leaving thousands of related cases to proceed 
individually.
81
 
Grabill goes on to describe the proposed settlement in the first-responders 
litigation as “much like the Vioxx Settlement Agreement” because it 
required settling parties to opt in and would take effect only upon 
achieving a certain threshold of participation.
82
 He pays no attention to the 
liability framework created by ATSSSA, which preempted alternative 
remedies, capped the aggregate liability available to all claimants, and 
imposed a caveat that federal interests not be undermined when 
incorporating state tort law as a rule of decision. 
Whatever merit one attaches to off-the-rack arguments about the 
autonomy that litigants retain in an MDL proceeding in which claimants 
are pursuing their individual claims free from any formal constraints on 
recovery—and there is good reason to approach those arguments 
skeptically, given the limited nature of the attorney-client relationship in 
many mass cases, the pressure on claimants to accept prefabricated 
settlements, and the power of attorneys in a management committee to 
shape the course of the proceedings—such arguments carry much less 
force when the autonomy of litigants has been altered by a liability regime 
that formally transforms the resolution of their claims into an exercise in 
allocation. 
The same principles call for some critical attention to Judge Jack 
Weinstein’s opinion in the Zyprexa pharmaceutical litigation, which 
 
 
 80. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 81. Grabill, supra note 77, at 147. See also Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the 
Trend: Cutting Judicial “Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 321–22 (2011) (describing the consolidated first-responders’ litigation as a 
mere Rule 42 proceeding and disregarding the jurisdiction and venue provisions of ATSSSA). 
 82. Grabill, supra note 77, at 149–50. 
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contains one of the leading judicial statements of a quasi-class theory in 
justifying court supervision of mass aggregate litigation.
83
 The Zyprexa 
dispute involved claims that a drug used to treat schizophrenia produced 
weight gain and elevated blood-sugar levels as side effects, increasing the 
risk of diabetes. A large number of individual cases were consolidated 
before Judge Weinstein by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
whereupon the Judge appointed five special masters, one tasked with 
overseeing discovery and four (one of whom was Kenneth Feinberg) with 
facilitating settlement. After a little over a year, the efforts of this team 
produced a settlement consisting of a three-track claims-administration 
structure that covered about 8,000 plaintiffs. On the matter of fees and 
expenses, the Judge instructed the settlement special masters to “consult 
with each other and the parties and recommend to the court a fee schedule 
providing for allocation of expenses and a reasonable attorney’s fee,” 
using as the measure of reasonableness “the lesser of the maximum 
reasonable general fee schedule” recommended by the special masters 
themselves, “the fee agreed upon between the client and the attorney in an 
individual case, and the maximum amount permitted under the applicable 
local state rules and statutes.”
84
 Upon receiving the recommendation of the 
special masters, the Judge made a slight alteration that reduced the 
percentage cap on contingency fees and gave the special masters discretion 
to make further adjustments up or down in individual cases.
85
 
On the issue of attorney’s fees, there is authority supporting the power 
of judges to engage in supervisory review to ensure that the attorneys who 
appear before them do not use the processes of the court in an unethical 
manner to extract excessive or coercive fees from the parties they 
represent. Judge Weinstein discusses those authorities in his order 
reducing the negotiated fees, and his account of the fee negotiations—
which saw some attorneys seeking forty percent contingencies from their 
clients—suggests that supervision on that issue may indeed have been 
warranted.
86
 But rather than rely solely upon that more limited species of 
 
 
 83. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Zyprexa 
II]. 
 84. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Zyprexa 
I]. 
 85. Zyprexa II, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 490–491. 
 86. Professor Ratner raises legitimate questions concerning the applicability of the authorities 
cited in Zyprexa to an MDL proceeding. See Morris A. Ratner, Achieving Procedural Goals Through 
Indirection: The Use of Ethics Doctrine to Justify Contingency Fee Caps in MDL Aggregate 
Settlements, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2013). As Ratner points out, the authorities upon which 
Judge Weinstein and several of his MDL colleagues have relied in supervising contingency awards 
generally “involved highly-contextualized and case-specific court supervision of attorneys’ fees, where 
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power, the Judge begins his analysis with a broader theory of the 
supervisory role of courts in non-class aggregate cases: 
While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature of a private 
agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has 
many of the characteristics of a class action and may be properly 
characterized as a quasi-class action subject to general equitable 
powers of the court. The large number of plaintiffs subject to the 
same settlement matrix approved by the court; the utilization of 
special masters appointed by the court to control discovery and to 
assist in reaching and administering a settlement; the court's order 
for a huge escrow fund; and other interventions by the court, reflect 
a degree of court control supporting its imposition of fiduciary 
standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel 
regarding fees and expenses. 
 No one except the trial judge, assisted by special masters, can 
exercise this ethical control of fees effectively. Many of the 
individual plaintiffs are both mentally and physically ill and are 
largely without power or knowledge to negotiate fair fees; 
plaintiffs’ counsel have a built-in conflict of interest; and the 
defendant is buying peace and is generally disinterested in how the 
fund is divided so long as it does not jeopardize the settlement.
87
 
This strong statement of the quasi-class theory could equally be used to 
justify judicial supervision and approval of all the terms of a mass action 
settlement, not merely the details of attorney compensation, as leading 
commentators were quick to recognize.
88
 
Judge Weinstein’s articulation of the quasi-class theory in Zyprexa is a 
statement of judicial authority in a purely “procedural” mode, in several 
respects. First, Judge Weinstein makes no reference to the liability policies 
underlying the dispute, instead relying upon features of the suit—a large 
number of claimants with limited ability to participate or negotiate with 
 
 
the plaintiffs were legally incompetent . . . or where court intervention in fee issues was attendant to 
either the award of statutory fees . . . or to the creation of a common fund as part of a class action 
settlement.” Id. at 76. At the very least, Ratner argues, a more fully realized justification is required to 
extend these precedents to MDL proceedings. This critique is well taken, but for present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that such debates still center on the status of MDL parties and the ethical 
responsibilities of the court, rather than the more far-reaching theory of the quasi-class that Judge 
Weinstein chose to rely upon in Zyprexa. 
 87. Id. at 491–92. See also Zyprexa I, 233 F.R.D. at 122–23. 
 88. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 
214–15. 
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counsel and the imperfect alignment of incentives—to which he ascribes 
trans-substantive significance. Second, the Judge points to his own earlier 
managerial decisions, creating a “degree of court control” in the 
proceeding, as a justification for his Rule 23-style supervision of proposed 
settlements, an argument that might be vulnerable to a charge of analytical 
bootstrapping, although the federal policies underlying the MDL statute 
itself might go some way toward answering those criticisms. The Judge’s 
lack of attention to underlying liability policies in this broad statement of 
principle is worthy of particular note in light of his discussion of 
attorney’s fees, where he looks to state and federal authorities as sources 
of underlying policy guidance.
89
 
My purpose here is not to argue that a trans-substantive account of the 
judicial function is inadequate to support the type of managerial power 
that Judge Weinstein exercised in Zyprexa. Some scholars have made that 
case,
90
 although I am more convinced by the work of others who have 
examined the dynamics of mass adjudication in the courtroom, in attorney-
client relations, and in the economics of litigation and concluded that such 
proceedings raise serious questions about the absence of judicial 
supervision and the need to protect vulnerable claimants, even if the trans-
substantive authority of judges to address these needs remains contested.
91
 
My purpose here is more limited: to juxtapose Zyprexa with the World 
Trade Center first-responders litigation and invite a comparison with the 
more specific grounding that the underlying liability policies provided to 
Judge Hellerstein’s rulings. 
Judge Weinstein relies upon a set of general observations about the 
practical dynamics of mass consolidation to justify the use of tools like the 
MDL statute and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, 42 and 53 to 
shape policy outcomes. These are indeed powerful tools, and the MDL 
statute in particular has received inadequate attention as a source of federal 
law on important matters of litigation policy. But these sources of 
authority say nothing about the policies that should govern the actual 
outcomes produced by a managerial process. Rather, it is the liability 
 
 
 89. Zyprexa II, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 492–96. 
 90. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1769 (2005) (discussing controls on aggregate settlement in terms of individual consent and the 
ethical rules of lawyer-client relations and conflicts of interest, rather than judicial supervision). 
 91. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of 
Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 585 (2006) (arguing that the 
paradigm of individual client relations, notice, and litigant autonomy is inadequate to protect the 
interests of claimants in non-class mass aggregate proceedings). 
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policies underlying a mass dispute that must dictate outcomes.
92
 As 
Professor Burbank and I have explained in discussing the role of a judge 
overseeing a complex proceeding in federal diversity court: 
Sometimes, federal common law will be required to implement 
federal interests reflected in valid federal law, including the Rules 
themselves. Where this is so, state law will be displaced. 
Sometimes, however, the federal common law analysis will fail to 
unearth interests that are demonstrably rooted in existing federal 
law. In the latter class of cases, the limitations on federal common 
law in diversity litigation will often require that state law control the 
analysis because no valid federal interests requiring protection exist 
to displace it.
93
 
Just as Rule 23 has sometimes served as “the occasion for the Court to 
implement class action policies in federal common law that it was 
otherwise authorized to make,”
94
 governing such matters as the tolling of 
statutes of limitation or the preclusive effect of a judgment, so can the 
rules governing mass consolidations in federal court serve as the occasion 
for implementing managerial litigation policies that fall within a federal 
court’s independent common-law authority: promoting the reliability and 
factual accuracy of the proceedings and ensuring that the interests of 
claimants are not compromised through neglect, faithless behavior, or 
iatrogenic effects created by the very initiation of a consolidated action. 
But when it comes to determining the adequacy of a global settlement or 
the propriety of trade-offs reflected in the allocation of damages among 
claimants, the judge must look to the underlying law, be it state or federal, 
for guidance.
95
 In such a case, the underlying liability policies define the 
 
 
 92. Professors Silver and Miller set forth an alternative approach to the quasi-class model that 
seeks to improve the incentive structures of lawyers and the court itself to produce good outcomes for 
claimants. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). The authors point 
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as a model for their approach, although they do not 
offer a fully elaborated justification for the importation of the PSLRA’s approach into disputes 
governed by different substantive legal regimes (that is, outside the securities law context).  
 93. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 40, at 26–27. 
 94. Id. at 50. 
 95. This is true even in the case of class actions subject to Rule 23(e)(2)’s requirement that 
settlements only be approved upon a finding that the result is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” The 
measure of fairness and adequacy must be taken against the underlying liability policies, and those 
policies fall outside a federal judge’s common law authority in a diversity case. Justice Ginsburg 
makes the same basic point in her opinion for the Court in Gasperini when describing the standard 
against which a Rule 59 motion for new trial based upon excessive damages must be measured. See 
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) (“It is indeed ‘Hornbook’ law 
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point of reference for claimant outcomes and shape the authority of the 
judge to manage the proceedings in service of those ends. 
IV. LIABILITY POLICY AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER THE 
FEDERAL RULES: THE SWARM-DOWNLOAD COPYRIGHT CASES 
The underlying substantive law can also influence the more quotidian 
aspects of a lawsuit. Trial judges have broad discretion in their 
administration of many of the procedural doctrines that shape civil actions. 
We typically discuss those doctrines in endogenous terms, with judges 
seeking to maximize such procedural values as the efficient management 
of their dockets, the avoidance of unnecessary litigation burdens on parties 
and witnesses, and the fair, accurate and expedient resolution of claims. 
This focus is appropriate and indeed required by the rules themselves, 
most prominently in the case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which 
admonishes that the Federal Rules “be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”
96
 But such endogenous concerns need not be a judge’s only 
point of reference when making discretionary procedural rulings. It is 
equally appropriate for a judge to consider the potential impact of a ruling 
on the liability policies bound up in the substantive law when exercising 
procedural latitude.
97
 A series of procedural copyright rulings now 
percolating up through the federal district courts provides an apt 
illustration. 
The cases giving rise to these rulings involve claims brought by the 
owners of sexually-explicit movies seeking to prevent online violations of 
their copyright perpetrated through bit-torrent or swarm downloading. A 
swarm download is a technique by which a large electronic file is 
downloaded in pieces from multiple sources in parallel and the pieces then 
reassembled into a complete whole. The technique will often enable users 
to download files much more quickly. Picture information on the Internet 
as water flowing through various rivers, streams, and rivulets. If a user 
 
 
that a most usual ground for a Rule 59 motion is that ‘the damages are excessive.’ Whether damages 
are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that 
governance other than the law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New York.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 97. The leading academic commentary on the exercise of discretion under the Federal Rules 
remains Judge Friendly’s classic article. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 
EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). Judge Friendly offers an indispensable account of judicial process values in 
discussing the administration of discretionary doctrines, but he leaves unexplored the role of 
substantive liability policy in shaping judicial discretion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013] MANAGERIAL JUDGING AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1061 
 
 
 
 
downloads a file through a single pathway, then the download speed is 
limited by the smallest rivulet in that pathway. But if the user can 
download many pieces of the file from multiple different sources, then he 
can overcome the drag caused by the small rivulets, stacking them together 
in parallel and enabling much more data to flow in a short period of time. 
A user who downloads a file using swarm technology can then become a 
new source for future swarm downloads. In such a case, the file is kept on 
the user’s computer in a manner that makes it accessible as a download 
source for future swarms. 
Swarms have been used aggressively to download sexually-explicit 
movies, perhaps because the technique enables users to acquire the films 
anonymously (and, obviously, for free). Owners of these movies seeking 
to protect their copyright encounter two related challenges. The first 
involves the identification of the alleged perpetrators. Because the swarm 
is anonymous, copyright owners are typically able to identify only the IP 
address of the source that participated in the swarm.
98
 The tools of 
discovery can assist copyright holders by empowering them to subpoena 
information from Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), which keep records 
of the identities of IP address holders, though many ISPs purge that 
information periodically, limiting the window of time during which 
alleged perpetrators could be identified. The second problem arises from 
the sheer number of alleged perpetrators. Swarm downloading is a form of 
distributed copyright violation. There is not a single, readily suable entity 
that is responsible for each violation. Rather, hundreds, or thousands, of 
individual users make up the ad hoc group responsible for the hundreds, or 
thousands, of violations. These users typically do not know each other and 
have no relationship other than their anonymously shared file swarms. 
In response to these problems, copyright holders have adopted 
aggressive litigation strategies in seeking to pursue civil remedies. Relying 
upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, they have attempted to join 
alleged violators as anonymous “Doe” defendants in large numbers, 
sometimes in the thousands and frequently in the hundreds, identifying 
them only by the IP addresses used in illegal swarm downloads. And 
relying upon Rule 26(d), they have asked district courts to permit them to 
take third-party discovery from ISPs prior to the Rule 26(f) conference of 
the parties, so that they can learn the identities of the IP address holders 
and serve them individually in the lawsuit. Dozens of district courts 
 
 
 98. An IP or Internet Protocol address is a number that uniquely identifies a location to or from 
which data is transmitted. Thus, for example, the cable modem or wireless router attached to a typical 
home computer has an IP address that locates it for the rest of the world. 
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around the country have rendered opinions in these disputes, and they 
have varied widely in their responses. 
The case for some form of pre-conference discovery is strong in these 
disputes. The plaintiffs allege facts that, if true, would constitute violations 
of their copyright, and subpoenaing records from ISPs is the only tool by 
which they might be able to identify the alleged perpetrators. The tool is 
not a perfect one. ISP records will only give the identity of the subscriber 
who has paid for a given Internet account. They will not indicate who was 
using the account at the time of the swarm download. So, if a teenager 
uses his parent’s Internet account to participate in a swarm, or a college 
student uses his roommate’s account—or, for that matter, if a user 
participates in a swarm through a publicly-available wireless site—the ISP 
records will identify someone other than the perpetrator and may wind up 
giving little useful information. Courts have noted that some copyright 
holders might send aggressive settlement demands to account holders after 
obtaining discovery from ISPs, despite the uncertainty around whether a 
given account holder is the actual perpetrator, pressuring potentially 
innocent individuals into settling for nuisance value. Courts are right to be 
concerned about such tactics, which they can address through orders that 
limit the use that plaintiffs can make of information obtained from ISPs 
and the circumstances and manner in which they may contact account 
holders.
99
 But some kind of pre-conference discovery appears necessary to 
enable plaintiffs to identify the defendants they wish to sue. 
The more difficult question is what type of action plaintiffs should be 
permitted to assemble when they seek to enforce their copyright in swarm 
download cases. Rule 20(a) provides that defendants “may be joined in 
one action as defendants” if claims are asserted against them “with respect 
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences” that share common questions of law or fact.
100
 
Trial courts have wide discretion in shaping the boundaries of a civil 
action in their administration of Rule 20 and Rule 21, which empowers the 
Court “at any time, on just terms, [to] add or drop a party.”
101
 Two 
questions thus present themselves in these cases. First, is joinder possible 
under Rule 20—do the proposed defendants satisfy the threshold 
 
 
 99. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (crafting 
an order designed to protect account holders from premature disclosure or exploitation of identifying 
information). 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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requirements of the rule? Second, is joinder advisable under Rule 20—
should the court permit it?
102
 
The swarm download cases clearly satisfy the requirement of a 
common issue of law or fact: the law applicable to the violation of the 
plaintiff’s copyright and many of the factual circumstances surrounding a 
particular swarm will be common to all defendants. The transaction-or-
series-of-transactions requirement is more debatable, and district courts 
have differed in their analysis. One leading opinion found that  
it is difficult to see how . . . a series of individuals connecting either 
directly with each other or as part of a chain or ‘swarm’ of 
connectivity designed to illegally copy and share the exact same 
copyrighted file . . . could not constitute a “series of transactions or 
occurrences,” for purposes of Rule 20(a),
103
 
while others have held that this requirement is defeated by the lack of any 
relationship among swarm participants and the distribution of swarm 
activity across time (swarm activity around a given file can sometimes last 
for months) and digital geography.
104
 
Threshold questions about the boundaries of a transaction or 
occurrence determine whether joinder is available at all. As to that 
 
 
 102. It bears noting that the decision of the Supreme Court in Shady Grove creates the possibility 
of an alternate construction of Rule 20 by viewing the permissive language of the Rule (parties “may 
join” or “may be joined”) as granting discretion to the parties in deciding how to structure their suits 
but none to the trial court, which must permit joinder whenever the threshold requirements of the Rule 
are satisfied. Shady Grove relied upon such a reading of Rule 23 to reject the efforts of the lower 
federal courts in that case to give effect to New York CPLR § 901(b). See Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (2010). 
Allstate asserts that Rule 23 neither explicitly nor implicitly empowers a federal court ‘to 
certify a class in each and every case’ where the Rule’s criteria are met. But that is exactly 
what Rule 23 does: It says that if the prescribed preconditions are satisfied ‘[a] class action 
may be maintained’ (emphasis added)—not ‘a class action may be permitted.’ Courts do not 
maintain actions; litigants do. The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion 
residing in the plaintiff: He may bring his claim in a class action if he wishes. 
Id. This portion of the analysis in Shady Grove is probably not sustainable. For present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that the syntactical differences between Rule 20 and Rule 23, coupled with the 
control mechanism of Rule 21, should defeat any attempt to apply Shady Grove’s rigid interpretation 
of Rule 23 to the joinder of individual parties. 
 103. Digital Sin, 279 F.R.D. at 244. 
 104. See, e.g., Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1–131, 280 F.R.D. 493, 498 (D. Ariz. 2012) 
(“[T]here is no logic to segregating the Arizona based members of the swarm from the non-Arizona 
based members, except Plaintiff's convenience. The Court finds this is not a basis for allowing 
permissive joinder.”); AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–97, No. C-11-03067-CW (DMR), 2011 WL 
2912909, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (finding that the “fundamental constraint” imposed by 
BitTorrent protocol “on the collaboration between copyright infringers” precludes Rule 20(a)(2)(A) 
from being satisfied). 
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question, the district court’s analysis in Digital Sin seems the most 
appropriate. As with the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction, the 
threshold requirements of permissive joinder set the outer boundaries for 
the types of civil action that are possible, and permissive joinder is 
discretionary, meaning that a liberal approach does not impose a de facto 
rule mandating more complicated lawsuits. Thus, Judge Nathan is correct 
to rely upon the Court’s statement in United Mine Workers of America v. 
Gibbs
105
 that “the impulse [under the Federal Rules] is toward entertaining 
the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; 
joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”
106
 The 
sentiment is an appropriate one for defining the parameters of Rule 20. 
This approach is also consistent with the treatment of Rule 20 that 
Professors James, Hazard and Leubsdorf provide in their treatise, which 
conceptualizes the series-of-transactions requirement as a reflection of 
underlying liability policies. When “completely independent acts converge 
to cause an injury, for all or for some part of which the actors have a 
common liability under substantive law,” the cases have generally 
concluded that the transaction test is satisfied, and James et al. embrace 
that result.
107
 
The question whether joinder is advisable in these cases, and hence 
whether the district court should exercise its discretion to permit it, 
requires broader thinking about the sources of law that should influence 
the court’s decision. The impact of massive party joinder on the dynamics 
of litigation is one major consideration. Thus, Judge Teilborg in the 
District of Arizona denied a plaintiff’s request to join 131 individual 
swarm defendants out of concern for the impact on the litigation, detailing 
the many ways in which “allowing this case to proceed against 131 
Defendants creates more management problems than it promotes 
 
 
 105. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
 106. Id. at 724. 
 107. FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
563–64 (5th ed. 2001). My thanks to Steve Burbank for drawing my attention to this treatment of Rule 
20. 
 The authors go on to question the result in Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. 
Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959), a rare and much-noted instance of a court finding the transaction test not 
satisfied. Plaintiff Insull asserted libel claims against three unrelated defendants for statements they 
made over a three-year period, and the district court found the claims too separate in time and 
circumstance to satisfy the transaction or occurrence requirement. While acknowledging that this result 
is “not wholly untenable,” the authors question why “a common liability for the same damage” should 
permit joinder of multiple defendants “but not a liability for separate but similar damage inflicted on 
the same plaintiff at the same time,” particularly when the latter circumstance “involve[s] great 
overlapping of proof” and common questions about the proper measure of damages for each. James et 
al., supra, at 564–65. 
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efficiency.”
108
 These are concerns arising from Rule 20 itself and clearly 
require attention. Indeed, taking into account such litigation concerns in a 
request for massive individual joinder operates as a complement to Rule 
23(a)(1), which permits a class action to proceed only when “the class is 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”
109
 If the 
impracticality of joining numerous individuals is one requirement for 
entertaining a representative action, it is obviously a justification for 
denying excessive joinder in a proposed individual action. 
But Professor Cover reminds us that “there are also demands of 
particular substantive objectives which cannot be served except through 
the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to 
an area of law.”
110
 What impact will permitting or denying massive joinder 
have upon the underlying liability policies in these cases? That question, 
too, can and should guide a district court’s exercise of its discretion under 
Rule 20, even after it finds that the threshold requirements of the rule are 
satisfied. In the swarm download cases, at least two countervailing 
considerations are at work. There is the threat that denying joinder would 
frustrate the goals of the underlying law. Judge Nathan indicates her 
awareness of this concern when she notes that denying joinder might 
“introduce significant obstacles in plaintiffs’ efforts to protect their 
copyrights from illegal file-sharers” in part because “requiring aggrieved 
parties to file hundreds or even thousands of separate copyright 
infringement actions” would entail the payment of hundreds or even 
thousands of individual filing fees at $350 per action.
111
 Conversely, 
massive joinder and pre-conference discovery carry with them the danger 
of abusive settlement practices and misdirected enforcement. Several 
courts have noted the danger that copyright holders will “send settlement 
demands to the individuals whom the ISP identified as the IP subscriber” 
 
 
 108. Third Degree Films, 280 F.R.D. at 498. 
 109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 110. Cover, supra note 4, at 718. 
 111. Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quotation and 
alterations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012) (requiring “parties instituting any civil action . . . to pay 
a filing fee of $350”). Judge Howell relies upon a similar concern in permitting broad joinder and pre-
conference discovery in a case involving over 5,000 total defendants, writing: 
If the Court were to consider severance at this juncture, plaintiffs would face significant 
obstacles in their efforts to protect their copyrights from illegal file-sharers and this would 
only needlessly delay their cases. The plaintiffs would be forced to file 5,583 separate 
lawsuits, in which they would then move to issue separate subpoenas to ISPs for each 
defendant's identifying information. Plaintiffs would additionally be forced to pay the Court 
separate filing fees in each of these cases, which would further limit their ability to protect 
their legal rights. 
Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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despite the possibility that the subscriber may not be the alleged infringer, 
and indeed that mass joinder combined with pre-conference discovery 
would particularly lend itself to this practice.
112
 “That individual—whether 
guilty of copyright infringement or not—would then have to decide 
whether to pay money to retain legal assistance to fight the claim that he 
or she illegally downloaded sexually explicit materials.”
113
 Given the 
discomfort or awkwardness that many people would feel in having their 
names associated with a sexually-explicit film, the danger of abusive or 
misdirected enforcement is acute. 
These concerns operate at the juncture between procedure and 
substance, and district courts must attend to both good case-management 
practice and liability policy in resolving these disputes. Thus, when Judge 
Nathan permitted the plaintiff in Digital Sin to obtain pre-conference 
discovery against 176 Doe defendants, she crafted an order designed to 
prevent abusive settlement tactics that required the ISPs to perform an 
intermediary role, serving the subpoena upon the account holders 
identified via IP address but preserving their anonymity during a safe 
harbor period in which they could contest the subpoena or move to 
proceed anonymously.
114
 No less an authority on civil practice than Judge 
Lee Rosenthal has given her imprimatur to this approach, adopting Judge 
Nathan’s order in a swarm download case before her court.
115
 
This way of proceeding imposes costs upon the ISPs, which are 
required to become active participants in the early stages of the lawsuit 
with a primary role in administering discovery requests and facilitating 
challenges brought by subscribers. There is no question that, as a general 
matter, the provisions for third-party practice encompass the possibility of 
such costs: Rule 45 admonishes district courts to avoid “undue burden” in 
issuing subpoenas, contemplating that some burdens might be necessary in 
third-party discovery practice.
116
 But what justifies the imposition of such 
costs in this class of cases? 
 
 
 112. SBO Pictures Inc. v. Does 1–3036, No. 11-4220 (SC), 2011 WL 6002620, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 30, 2011). 
 113. Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–130, No. C-11-3826 (DMR), 2011 WL 5573960, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011). 
 114. Digital Sin, 279 F.R.D. at 244–45. 
 115. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1–59, No. H-12-0699, 2012 WL 1096117, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1), stating that  
A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps 
to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The issuing 
court must enforce this duty and impose an appropriate sanction—which may include lost 
earnings and reasonable attorney's fees—on a party or attorney who fails to comply. 
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The answer follows from the underlying liability policies. ISPs provide 
a service that has high social utility, offering widespread access to the 
Internet and permitting users to explore the web anonymously. But ISPs 
also impose social costs, facilitating the unauthorized copying of protected 
materials in violation of copyright law.
117
 The policies underlying the law 
of copyright speak to this trade-off. If the distributed and anonymous 
nature of swarm downloads creates the danger of widespread copyright 
violations with no remedy, then copyright policy suggests that the 
businesses selling the service that facilitates those violations should also 
have to bear the costs associated with facilitating a remedy. 
In a different type of dispute—one where the values and activities 
protected by the underlying law were not threatened in a singular fashion 
and where the burdened third party was not also a participant in 
undermining those protected values—this assessment of costs and burdens 
might well play out differently. The rules on joinder and third-party 
discovery offer the tools for judges to use in adjudicating such disputes, 
and they define threshold conditions that must be satisfied for those tools 
to be available. Trans-substantive procedural values like efficiency, 
fairness to parties in the processing of their claims, and the manageability 
of the resulting proceedings all inform the analysis. But, in appropriate 
cases, the goals of the substantive law must also play a role in assessing 
the allocation of costs and burdens among the litigants. 
This discussion of joinder in swarm-download disputes should sound 
unremarkable—an assessment of litigation dynamics and policy impacts 
of a type that courts make all the time. It draws together procedural and 
substantive values in a manner that is both appropriate and unavoidable 
when setting the metes and bounds of civil disputes. That same amalgam 
of procedural and substantive values characterizes large questions like the 
shape of class action practice under Title VII and extraordinary cases like 
the 9/11 first-responders proceeding. And yet the role of liability policy in 
defining and shaping the parameters of litigation in all these settings 
seldom receives the attention it requires. 
 
 
 117. For present purposes, I adopt a simplistic description of social costs and copyright: the law of 
copyright seeks to prevent unauthorized copying of protected material, and anonymous Internet access 
facilitates that unauthorized copying. I leave unexplored larger questions concerning the level of 
constraint that is desirable in copyright enforcement; whether the net value added to copyrighted 
material by the open architecture of the Internet offsets any costs that result from unauthorized 
copying; and whether copyright itself is a viable paradigm in electronic media. A deeper examination 
of these factors might influence the discovery analysis. 
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CONCLUSION 
The explosion of interest in the role of judges over the last thirty years 
has produced valuable insights into the institutional responsibilities and 
limitations of the judiciary. The increasing demands that litigants have 
placed upon the civil justice system make such discussions of the judicial 
function ever more salient, with class actions, mass tort adjudication, and 
the MDL process bringing important regulatory matters within the 
compass of private adjudication. But these insights have come at a cost. In 
focusing so much attention on the craft of judging, we have gotten out of 
the habit of discussing complex-litigation dynamics—both the prosaic and 
the extraordinary—in light of the underlying substantive law. 
Writing in 1975, near the beginning of what we now identify as the 
threshold of the modern era of managerial judging and complex litigation, 
Professor Cover foresaw the danger that the growing power of our uniform 
and trans-substantive procedural code might crowd out proper 
consideration of underlying substantive values. 
Professor Moore's great achievement—the continued viability, 
efficacy and, indeed, excellence of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure—seems all the more remarkable when one realizes that 
the river of litigation constantly erodes the architecture of process-
oriented codes, leaving us with its case law incidents of application. 
It is extraordinary that our legal system holds a divided view of 
procedure: Our norms for minimal process, expressed in the 
constitutional rubric of procedural due process, are generally 
conceded to constitute a substance-sensitive calibrated continuum in 
which the nature of the process due is connected to the nature of the 
substantive interest to be vindicated; yet our primary set of norms 
for optimal procedure, the procedure available in our courts of 
general jurisdiction, is assumed to be largely invariant with 
substance. It is by no means intuitively apparent that the procedural 
needs of a complex antitrust action, a simple automobile negligence 
case, a hard-fought school integration suit, and an environmental 
class action to restrain the building of a pipeline are sufficiently 
identical to be usefully encompassed in a single set of rules which 
makes virtually no distinctions among such cases in terms of 
available process. My point is not that the Federal Rules are not 
workable over such a broad range. But it may be worth asking in 
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what sense that codification works well because of its trans-
substantive aspiration, and in what sense it works in spite of it.
118
 
The decades have proven Cover prescient. The success of the Federal 
Rules has produced an ever-greater alienation from substantive values in 
procedural analysis. 
The mode of analysis set forth in this Article aims to reverse that trend. 
Its prescription should be a source of comfort and reassurance to judges. 
When judges confront litigation problems that are unprecedented and 
intractable, they can often look to the controlling liability policies set by 
politically accountable decision makers to ground their rulings and justify 
the allocation of benefits and burdens that those rulings entail. When 
judges must determine whether to constrain or authorize expansive and 
unprecedented forms of litigation in class or mass-tort adjudication, they 
can use the goals of the underlying substantive law in the disputes before 
them as guideposts for their decisions. And when judges issue rulings on 
open-textured procedural provisions that carry the potential for dramatic 
trans-substantive effect, they can specify the manner in which the 
underlying law shapes their analysis and issue holdings that are more 
focused in their reasoning and more modest in their precedential impact. 
The managerial judge need not feel unguided at sea. Liability policy can 
provide a compass. 
To return to Karl Llewellyn’s metaphor and update it for a new era, we 
must learn to read trans-substantive procedure through the spectacles of 
the substantive law. 
 
 
 118. Cover, supra note 4, at 732–33. 
 
